

U.S. Embassy Bonn Confidential Cable to Secretary of State on the speech of the German Foreign Minister: Genscher Outlines His Vision of a New European Architecture.

Feb 1, 1990

4. (U) GENSCHER OPENS HIS SPEECH, GIVEN TO AN ACADEMIC CONFERENCE IN TUZING ON JANUAR

8. (U) ON THE OTHER HAND, GENSCHER MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THE CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE GERMAN UNIFICATION PROCESS MUST NOT LEAD TO AN "IMPAIRMENT OF SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS." THEREFORE, NATO SHOULD RULE OUT AN "EXPANSION OF ITS TERRITORY TOWARDS THE EAST, I.E. MOVING IT CLOSER TO THE SOVIET BORDERS."

Memorandum of Conversation between James Baker and Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow.

Feb 9, 1990

There would, of course, have to be iron-clad guarantees that NATO's jurisdiction or forces would not move eastward. And this would have to be done in a manner that would satisfy Germany's neighbors to the east.

Record of conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and James Baker in Moscow. (Excerpts)

Feb 9, 1990

Baker: And the last point. NATO is the mechanism for securing the U.S. presence in Europe. If NATO is liquidated, there will be no such mechanism in Europe. We understand that not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO's present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.

We believe that consultations and discussions within the framework of the "two + four" mechanism should guarantee that Germany's unification will not lead to NATO's military organization spreading to the east.

I want to ask you a question, and you need not answer it right now. Supposing unification takes place, what would you prefer: a united Germany outside of NATO, absolutely independent and without American troops; or a united Germany keeping its connections with NATO, but with the guarantee that NATO's jurisdiction or troops will not spread east of the present boundary?

Gorbachev: We will think everything over. We intend to discuss all these questions in depth at the leadership level. It goes without saying that a broadening of the NATO zone is not acceptable.

Baker: We agree with that.

Memorandum of conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl Feb 10, 1990

H. Kohl: We believe that NATO should not expand its scope. We have to find a reasonable resolution. I correctly understand the security interests of the Soviet Union, and I realize that you, Mr. General Secretary, and the Soviet leadership will have to clearly explain what is happening to the Soviet people.

Letter from Mr. Powell (N. 10) to Mr. Wall: Thatcher-Gorbachev memorandum of conversation. Jun 8, 1990

But we must find ways to give the Soviet Union confidence that its security would be assured. She and Mr Gorbachev should put in hand further work on the basis of their discussion. Gorbachev said that he agreed with that . . .⁸

Ambassador Rodric Braithwaite diary, 05 March 1991 Mar 5, 1991

during Major's visit to Moscow and right after his one-on-one with President Gorbachev. During the meeting with Major, Gorbachev had raised his concerns about the new NATO dynamics: "Against the background of favorable processes in Europe, I suddenly start receiving information that certain circles intend to go on further strengthening NATO as the main security instrument in Europe.

Major responded: "I believe that your thoughts about the role of NATO in the current situation are the result of misunderstanding. We are not talking about strengthening of NATO.

Next we go to meet the Generals. Yazov leads the pack, and is in fine form.

Soviet position on NATO and the CFE. He professes to be worried that the Czechs, Poles and Hungarians will join NATO. Havel has been making equivocal statements. Major assures him that nothing of the sort will happen. He complains about the unfairness of the CFE, which was lopsided right from the

Memorandum to Boris Yeltsin from Russian Supreme Soviet delegation to NATO HQs Jul 1, 1991

American troops in Europe in the near future by 80 thousand men. Woerner stressed that the NATO Council and he are against the expansion of NATO (13 out of 16 NATO members support this point of view). In the near future, at his meeting with L. Walesa and the Romanian leader A. Iliescu, he will oppose Poland and Romania joining NATO, and earlier this was stated to Hungary and Czechoslovakia. We should not allow, stated M. Woerner, the isolation of the USSR from the European community.

Letter from Francois Mitterrand to George Bush May 25, 1990

As you know, I have met with Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow on May 25.

I have argued that it was not reasonable to think of another solution than the one of Germany's participation in the Atlantic Alliance, and I indicated that, on the Western side, we would certainly not refuse to detail the guarantees that he would have a right to expect for his country's security.

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TELNO 460

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INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW

MY 4 IPTS: QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS, BONN, 4

MARCH: SECURITY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

SUMMARY

1. UK CIRCULATES PROMISED PAPER ON SECURITY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT MEMBERSHIP OF NATO AND SECURITY GUARANTEES UNACCEPTABLE. AGREEMENT TO CONSIDER STATEMENT BY SPRING NAC INDICATING NATO'S INTEREST IN SECURITY AND STABILITY IN EASTERN EUROPE. THICKENING OF BILATERAL RELATIONS AND NATO/EAST EUROPEAN CONTACTS.

DETAIL

2. CHROBOG (GERMANY) SAID WE NEEDED NEW IDEAS ON HOW TO PROVIDE FOR THE SECURITY OF CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. WE HAD MADE IT CLEAR DURING THE 2+4 NEGOTIATIONS THAT WE WOULD NOT EXTEND NATO BEYOND THE ELBE (SIC). WE COULD NOT THEREFORE OFFER MEMBERSHIP OF NATO TO POLAND AND THE OTHERS. WE MIGHT HOWEVER CONSIDER REFERRING TO OUR INTEREST IN THESE COUNTRIES IN FUTURE NATO DECLARATIONS. FURTHER STEPS COULD BE TAKEN IN THE CSCE AND THROUGH BILATERAL AGREEMENTS.

3. WESTON CIRCULATED A BRITISH PAPER ON THE SUBJECT AND RAN THROUGH IT. WE HAD TO RESPOND TO THE REQUESTS FROM THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FOR CLOSER RELATIONS WITH NATO. THEY WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE EVENTUAL DANGER OF A REVANCHIST SOVIET UNION OR RUSSIA, INSTABILITY IN THE SOVIET UNION WITH POSSIBLE SPILL-OVER AND THE RISK OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. OUR AIM SHOULD BE FOR THE EAST EUROPEANS TO BECOME PROSPEROUS, DEMOCRATIC AND WESTERN ORIENTATED STATES, WITH THEIR OWN MILITARY FORCES STRONG ENOUGH TO DETER INTIMIDATION BUT NOT TO PRESENT A THREAT TO THEIR NEIGHBOURS. MANY OF THE THINGS WE COULD DO FOR THEM WOULD BE IN THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FIELD, AND WERE NOT IN THE GIFT OF NATO OR THE WEU. BUT THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC APPROACH WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH BY ITSELF.

THERE SEEMED A PSYCHOLOGICAL NEED IN EASTERN EUROPE TO EXAMINE THE MILITARY SECURITY DIMENSION. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN OUR RESPONSE NOT TO OSTRACISE THE RUSSIANS. WE COULD NOT OFFER EAST EUROPEANS MEMBERSHIP OR ASSOCIATE MEMBERSHIP OF NATO. NOR COULD WE OFFER EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT SECURITY GUARANTEES. THEY COULD NOT HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO AS A GROUP. NOR WOULD NATO HAVE A PEACEKEEPING ROLE IN THE REGION. WE SHOULD GIVE FURTHER THOUGHT TO A NUMBER OF OTHER POSSIBILITIES INCLUDING:

- A) NEGATIVE SECURITY GUARANTEES AS PROPOSED BY POLAND OR HUNGARY: OUR INITIAL VIEW WAS THAT THESE WERE NOT WORTH PURSUING.
- B) A NATO DECLARATION OF INTEREST IN THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE.
- C) MISCELLANEOUS CONTACTS BETWEEN NATO AND THESE COUNTRIES COVERING DEFENCE AND SECURITY ISSUES AS WELL BILATERAL CONTACTS BETWEEN WESTERN COUNTRIES AND INDIVIDUAL CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (HE LISTED THE UK PAPER'S EXAMPLES).

OUR INITIAL VIEW WAS THAT THE BEST WAY FORWARD WOULD BE TO CONSIDER REFERRING TO OUR INTEREST IN THESE COUNTRIES IN THE DECLARATION FROM THE SPRING MINISTERIAL NAC: A THICKENING OF RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE: BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DEFENCE CONTACTS WITH THEM; AND PROGRESS ON CSCE CRISIS MANAGEMENT.

4. BELTA AGREED. A SERIES OF VISITS BY EASTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS

UK

USA

TO WASHINGTON WERE PLANNED, BEGINNING WITH WALES. THE POLES AND OTHERS WERE SEEKING BILATERAL DECLARATIONS. THE US WOULD HAVE TO ADDRESS SECURITY IN THIS CONTEXT. WE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SOVIET UNION, BOTH IN THE 2+4 AND IN OTHER EXCHANGES, THAT WE WOULD NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM EASTERN EUROPE. WE MUST NOT PROVIDE A PRETEXT FOR HARDLINERS IN THE SOVIET UNION TO BUILD UP ANTI-WESTERN FEELING. NATO SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED FORMALLY OR INFORMALLY TO THE EAST. THE PRIMARY EASTERN EUROPEAN OBJECTIVE AND FORM OF REASSURANCE WAS THE REMOVAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. WE SHOULD THICKEN UP BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH INDIVIDUAL EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AS WELL AS NATO'S RELATIONS WITH THEM. WE MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER SEMINARS: EXCHANGES ON CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING; ROUND TABLE EXPERT MEETINGS; NATO TRAINING COURSES FOR EAST EUROPEAN OFFICERS IN CIVIL OVERSIGHT OF DEFENCE FORCES; INVITATIONS TO ATTEND THE NATO DEFENCE COLLEGE; ESTABLISHMENT OF ATLANTIC COUNCILS IN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE SOVIET UNION ETC. THERE WAS SCOPE FOR INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS TO UNDERTAKE TRAINING AND EXCHANGE OF OFFICERS, POSSIBLY ACADEMY TO ACADEMY, DISCUSSION OF STRATEGY AND POSSIBLY EVEN IN THE LONGER RUN SOME SORT OF ARMS SALES RELATIONSHIP.

5. CHROBOG SAID WE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER BILATERAL TREATIES CONTAINING NON-AGGRESSION ELEMENTS. SUCH TREATIES SHOULD ALSO BE CONCLUDED WITH THE SOVIET UNION. TINSIT (FRANCE) SAID SHE WOULD LOOK AT THE PROPOSALS IN THE BRITISH PAPER. FRANCE WAS NOT KEEN ON LINKS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE ALLIANCE AS SUCH. BUT SHE HAD NO MAJOR OBJECTION TO THE PROPOSALS SHE HAD HEARD. IT WAS AGREED THE DEBATE IN NATO SHOULD BE STEERED ALONG BROADLY THESE LINES.

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(USA, UK, ALL, FR) | Source : British National Archives, Prem 19/3326

MARCH 91

QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS, BONN, 6 MARCH

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2. CHROBOG (GERMANY) SAID WE NEEDED NEW IDEAS ON HOW TO PROVIDE FOR THE SECURITY OF CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. WE HAD MADE IT CLEAR DURING THE 2+4 NEGOTIATIONS THAT WE WOULD NOT EXTEND NATO BEYOND THE ELBE (SIC). WE COULD NOT THEREFORE OFFER MEMBERSHIP OF NATO TO POLAND AND THE OTHERS.

3. WESTON [UK]

THERE SEEMED A PSYCHOLOGICAL NEED IN EASTERN EUROPE TO EXAMINE THE MILITARY SECURITY DIMENSION. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN OUR RESPONSE NOT TO OSTRACISE THE RUSSIANS. WE COULD NOT OFFER EAST EUROPEANS MEMBERSHIP OR ASSOCIATE MEMBERSHIP OF NATO. NOR COULD WE OFFER EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT SECURITY GUARANTEES. THEY COULD NOT HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO AS A GROUP.

4. SEITZ [USA]

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5. TMSIT (FRANCE)

FRANCE WAS NOT KEEN ON LINKS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE ALLIANCE AS SUCH.